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Windows 7 蓝屏 0x000000d1 NETIO.SYS

Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


Loading Dump File [C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\HR\冯伟芬蓝屏代码\110717-15490-01.dmp]
Mini Kernel Dump File: Only registers and stack trace are available

Symbol search path is: SRV*C:\Symbols*https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is: 
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7601 (Service Pack 1) MP (4 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS
Built by: 7601.19135.amd64fre.win7sp1_gdr.160121-1718
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`04258000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`0449f730
Debug session time: Tue Nov  7 08:09:50.096 2017 (UTC + 8:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 0:20:17.298
Loading Kernel Symbols
...............................................................
................................................................
...............................
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
......
*******************************************************************************
*                                                                             *
*                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *
*                                                                             *
*******************************************************************************

Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.

BugCheck D1, {ffffffffffdff128, 2, 0, fffff8800152ca91}

Unable to load image Rt64win7.sys, Win32 error 0n2
*** WARNING: Unable to verify timestamp for Rt64win7.sys
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for Rt64win7.sys
Probably caused by : NETIO.SYS ( NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81 )

Followup: MachineOwner
---------

2: kd> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
*                                                                             *
*                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *
*                                                                             *
*******************************************************************************

DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (d1)
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an
interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high.  This is usually
caused by drivers using improper addresses.
If kernel debugger is available get stack backtrace.
Arguments:
Arg1: ffffffffffdff128, memory referenced
Arg2: 0000000000000002, IRQL
Arg3: 0000000000000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg4: fffff8800152ca91, address which referenced memory

Debugging Details:
------------------


READ_ADDRESS: GetPointerFromAddress: unable to read from fffff80004509100
 ffffffffffdff128 

CURRENT_IRQL:  2

FAULTING_IP: 
NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81
fffff880`0152ca91 448b6928        mov     r13d,dword ptr [rcx+28h]

CUSTOMER_CRASH_COUNT:  1

DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID:  VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT

BUGCHECK_STR:  0xD1

PROCESS_NAME:  System

TRAP_FRAME:  fffff8800458be20 -- (.trap 0xfffff8800458be20)
NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.
Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.
rax=000000000000003a rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=ffffffffffdff100
rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=fffff8800152ca91 rsp=fffff8800458bfb0 rbp=fffff8800458c100
 r8=fffff8800458c168  r9=fffff8800458c130 r10=fffff880018204a0
r11=0000000000000002 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+0x81:
fffff880`0152ca91 448b6928        mov     r13d,dword ptr [rcx+28h] ds:1010:ffffffff`ffdff128=????????
Resetting default scope

LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER:  from fffff800042cb969 to fffff800042cc3c0

STACK_TEXT:  
fffff880`0458bcd8 fffff800`042cb969 : 00000000`0000000a ffffffff`ffdff128 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`0458bce0 fffff800`042ca5e0 : fffffa80`10821010 fffff800`04403d0e 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0458c130 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`0458be20 fffff880`0152ca91 : fffffa80`105f1d02 fffffa80`0ee11b00 fffff880`0458c0a8 fffff880`042830ab : nt!KiPageFault+0x260
fffff880`0458bfb0 fffff880`016c3584 : fffff880`0458c178 fffff880`0458c148 fffff880`0458c168 fffff880`0458c130 : NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+0x81
fffff880`0458c050 fffff880`016da415 : 00000000`00000004 00000000`00000004 fffffa80`10678500 fffffa80`0e1dc5e0 : tcpip!TcpSatisfyReceiveRequests+0x1f4
fffff880`0458c330 fffff880`016d9209 : 00000000`b7c68a8e fffff880`0000003b fffff880`0458c548 fffff880`0458c568 : tcpip!TcpDeliverDataToClient+0x105
fffff880`0458c4b0 fffff880`016d6728 : fffff880`0458c850 fffff880`016e49d8 00000000`00000000 fffff880`016d44fa : tcpip!TcpDeliverReceive+0xa9
fffff880`0458c5b0 fffff880`016d7285 : fffff880`0458cb08 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`10678500 fffffa80`10678500 : tcpip!TcpTcbFastDatagram+0x208
fffff880`0458c770 fffff880`017b749a : fffffa80`0d2db900 fffffa80`0e3e8820 00000000`17402f53 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!TcpTcbReceive+0x1f5
fffff880`0458c920 fffff880`0173f470 : fffffa80`0e3e8820 fffffa80`0d418000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!TcpSynTcbReceive+0x2ea
fffff880`0458c9b0 fffff880`016d7c7b : fffff880`0642b922 fffffa80`0d418140 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x498a3
fffff880`0458cb00 fffff880`016ceb97 : fffffa80`0d2db900 fffffa80`0d2dd830 fffffa80`0000bd01 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!TcpPreValidatedReceive+0x36b
fffff880`0458cbd0 fffff880`016ce70a : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`017ef9a0 fffff880`0458cd90 fffffa80`0e1db3d0 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0x97
fffff880`0458cc90 fffff880`016cdd09 : fffffa80`00000000 fffff880`00000000 fffff880`0458cd00 fffff880`0458cd80 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x5a
fffff880`0458cd30 fffff880`016cba7f : 00000000`0000001c fffffa80`0d418140 fffff880`017ef9a0 00000000`0e363001 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x23a
fffff880`0458ce10 fffff880`016cb072 : fffffa80`0e3682b0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e363001 fffffa80`00000002 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x64f
fffff880`0458d010 fffff880`016ca50a : fffffa80`0e363010 fffff880`0458d140 fffffa80`0e363010 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x2b2
fffff880`0458d0f0 fffff800`042d8068 : fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00004800 fffff880`0456ffc0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0xda
fffff880`0458d140 fffff880`016cabd2 : fffff880`016ca430 fffffa80`0d2c0dc0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xd8
fffff880`0458d220 fffff880`014ef0eb : fffffa80`0e37a010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0d8ae1a0 fffffa80`0d8ae1a0 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb2
fffff880`0458d290 fffff880`014b8ad6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ndis!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb
fffff880`0458d300 fffff880`01431aa1 : fffffa80`0d8ae1a0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000002 : ndis!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x1d6
fffff880`0458d780 fffff880`05892868 : fffffa80`0da9e000 fffff880`0587ea00 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e1dccc0 : ndis!NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0xc1
fffff880`0458d7d0 fffffa80`0da9e000 : fffff880`0587ea00 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00000001 : Rt64win7+0x1b868
fffff880`0458d7d8 fffff880`0587ea00 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : 0xfffffa80`0da9e000
fffff880`0458d7e0 00000000`00000000 : fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000002`00000002 : Rt64win7+0x7a00


STACK_COMMAND:  kb

FOLLOWUP_IP: 
NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81
fffff880`0152ca91 448b6928        mov     r13d,dword ptr [rcx+28h]

SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX:  3

SYMBOL_NAME:  NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81

FOLLOWUP_NAME:  MachineOwner

MODULE_NAME: NETIO

IMAGE_NAME:  NETIO.SYS

DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP:  4ce79381

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  X64_0xD1_NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81

BUCKET_ID:  X64_0xD1_NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81

Followup: MachineOwner
---------

2: kd> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
*                                                                             *
*                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *
*                                                                             *
*******************************************************************************

DRIVER_IRQL_NOT_LESS_OR_EQUAL (d1)
An attempt was made to access a pageable (or completely invalid) address at an
interrupt request level (IRQL) that is too high.  This is usually
caused by drivers using improper addresses.
If kernel debugger is available get stack backtrace.
Arguments:
Arg1: ffffffffffdff128, memory referenced
Arg2: 0000000000000002, IRQL
Arg3: 0000000000000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg4: fffff8800152ca91, address which referenced memory

Debugging Details:
------------------


READ_ADDRESS:  ffffffffffdff128 

CURRENT_IRQL:  2

FAULTING_IP: 
NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81
fffff880`0152ca91 448b6928        mov     r13d,dword ptr [rcx+28h]

CUSTOMER_CRASH_COUNT:  1

DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID:  VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT

BUGCHECK_STR:  0xD1

PROCESS_NAME:  System

TRAP_FRAME:  fffff8800458be20 -- (.trap 0xfffff8800458be20)
NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.
Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.
rax=000000000000003a rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=ffffffffffdff100
rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=fffff8800152ca91 rsp=fffff8800458bfb0 rbp=fffff8800458c100
 r8=fffff8800458c168  r9=fffff8800458c130 r10=fffff880018204a0
r11=0000000000000002 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+0x81:
fffff880`0152ca91 448b6928        mov     r13d,dword ptr [rcx+28h] ds:1010:ffffffff`ffdff128=????????
Resetting default scope

LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER:  from fffff800042cb969 to fffff800042cc3c0

STACK_TEXT:  
fffff880`0458bcd8 fffff800`042cb969 : 00000000`0000000a ffffffff`ffdff128 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`0458bce0 fffff800`042ca5e0 : fffffa80`10821010 fffff800`04403d0e 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0458c130 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`0458be20 fffff880`0152ca91 : fffffa80`105f1d02 fffffa80`0ee11b00 fffff880`0458c0a8 fffff880`042830ab : nt!KiPageFault+0x260
fffff880`0458bfb0 fffff880`016c3584 : fffff880`0458c178 fffff880`0458c148 fffff880`0458c168 fffff880`0458c130 : NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+0x81
fffff880`0458c050 fffff880`016da415 : 00000000`00000004 00000000`00000004 fffffa80`10678500 fffffa80`0e1dc5e0 : tcpip!TcpSatisfyReceiveRequests+0x1f4
fffff880`0458c330 fffff880`016d9209 : 00000000`b7c68a8e fffff880`0000003b fffff880`0458c548 fffff880`0458c568 : tcpip!TcpDeliverDataToClient+0x105
fffff880`0458c4b0 fffff880`016d6728 : fffff880`0458c850 fffff880`016e49d8 00000000`00000000 fffff880`016d44fa : tcpip!TcpDeliverReceive+0xa9
fffff880`0458c5b0 fffff880`016d7285 : fffff880`0458cb08 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`10678500 fffffa80`10678500 : tcpip!TcpTcbFastDatagram+0x208
fffff880`0458c770 fffff880`017b749a : fffffa80`0d2db900 fffffa80`0e3e8820 00000000`17402f53 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!TcpTcbReceive+0x1f5
fffff880`0458c920 fffff880`0173f470 : fffffa80`0e3e8820 fffffa80`0d418000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!TcpSynTcbReceive+0x2ea
fffff880`0458c9b0 fffff880`016d7c7b : fffff880`0642b922 fffffa80`0d418140 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : tcpip! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x498a3
fffff880`0458cb00 fffff880`016ceb97 : fffffa80`0d2db900 fffffa80`0d2dd830 fffffa80`0000bd01 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!TcpPreValidatedReceive+0x36b
fffff880`0458cbd0 fffff880`016ce70a : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`017ef9a0 fffff880`0458cd90 fffffa80`0e1db3d0 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0x97
fffff880`0458cc90 fffff880`016cdd09 : fffffa80`00000000 fffff880`00000000 fffff880`0458cd00 fffff880`0458cd80 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x5a
fffff880`0458cd30 fffff880`016cba7f : 00000000`0000001c fffffa80`0d418140 fffff880`017ef9a0 00000000`0e363001 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x23a
fffff880`0458ce10 fffff880`016cb072 : fffffa80`0e3682b0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e363001 fffffa80`00000002 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x64f
fffff880`0458d010 fffff880`016ca50a : fffffa80`0e363010 fffff880`0458d140 fffffa80`0e363010 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlpReceiveNonPreValidatedNetBufferListChain+0x2b2
fffff880`0458d0f0 fffff800`042d8068 : fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00004800 fffff880`0456ffc0 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChainCalloutRoutine+0xda
fffff880`0458d140 fffff880`016cabd2 : fffff880`016ca430 fffffa80`0d2c0dc0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : nt!KeExpandKernelStackAndCalloutEx+0xd8
fffff880`0458d220 fffff880`014ef0eb : fffffa80`0e37a010 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0d8ae1a0 fffffa80`0d8ae1a0 : tcpip!FlReceiveNetBufferListChain+0xb2
fffff880`0458d290 fffff880`014b8ad6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ndis!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb
fffff880`0458d300 fffff880`01431aa1 : fffffa80`0d8ae1a0 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000002 : ndis!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x1d6
fffff880`0458d780 fffff880`05892868 : fffffa80`0da9e000 fffff880`0587ea00 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e1dccc0 : ndis!NdisMIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0xc1
fffff880`0458d7d0 fffffa80`0da9e000 : fffff880`0587ea00 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00000001 : Rt64win7+0x1b868
fffff880`0458d7d8 fffff880`0587ea00 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 : 0xfffffa80`0da9e000
fffff880`0458d7e0 00000000`00000000 : fffffa80`0e1dccc0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000002`00000002 : Rt64win7+0x7a00


STACK_COMMAND:  kb

FOLLOWUP_IP: 
NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81
fffff880`0152ca91 448b6928        mov     r13d,dword ptr [rcx+28h]

SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX:  3

SYMBOL_NAME:  NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81

FOLLOWUP_NAME:  MachineOwner

MODULE_NAME: NETIO

IMAGE_NAME:  NETIO.SYS

DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP:  4ce79381

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  X64_0xD1_NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81

BUCKET_ID:  X64_0xD1_NETIO!RtlCopyMdlToMdlIndirect+81

Followup: MachineOwner
---------

2: kd> 



您好,

电脑重启之后,上传蓝屏minidump文件到百度网盘,文件默认路径在C:\Windows\Minidump(不需要进行压缩操作)。



最后更新:2017-11-23 10:04:16

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